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Key Points
The net fiscal impact of immigration is typically estimated as the difference between the taxes and other 
contributions migrants make to public finances and the costs of the public benefits and services they 
receive. This impact depends on the characteristics of migrants, their impacts on the labour market and 
the characteristics and rules of the welfare system, among other factors.
In theory, migrants who are young, skilled and doing highly-paid jobs are likely to make a more positive net 
fiscal contribution than those with low skills and low labour market participation rates.
The evidence suggests that the fiscal impact of migration in the UK is small (less than +/-1% of GDP) and 
differs by migrant group (e.g. EEA migrants vs non-EEA migrants, recent migrants vs all migrants). The 
existing results are subject to numerous key assumptions.
The Office for Budget Responsibility suggests higher net migration reduces pressure on government debt 
over time. This result is based on the assumption that incoming migrants are more likely to be of working 
age than the population in general.
Cross-country evidence for the years 2007-2009 suggests that the fiscal impact of migration in the 
UK (+ 0.46% of GDP) was greater than the fiscal impact of migration in 16 other OECD countries. The 
UK occupies the 11th position (out of 27 countries) in regards to the positive fiscal impact of migration 
across OECD countries.
This briefing provides an overview of the existing estimates on the impact of 
immigration on government finances for the UK and other countries and explores 
the conceptual and methodological issues related to estimating the fiscal impact of 
immigration. 
BRIEFING:  The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
THE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY | WWW.MIGRATIONOBSERVATORY.OX.AC.UK PAGE 3
Understanding the evidence
The existing estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration in the UK are limited because of a lack of data and accurate 
information about a wide range of important factors. For this and other reasons, a significant number of assumptions must 
be made in order to estimate the fiscal effects of immigration, and results tend to change based on these assumptions.
The estimation of the fiscal impact of immigration requires a comparison between the costs imposed by migrants 
on public finances (including the services and benefits used by migrants) and their taxes and other public finance 
contributions they make. There are two main ways of conducting this analysis: a static approach and a dynamic approach. 
The static approach is based on a specific year, and simply compares the contributions of migrants to public finances with 
the services and benefits received for that year. The advantage of this approach is its simplicity and the fact that it uses 
historical data, while the disadvantage is the lack of a forward-looking perspective given that it is a snapshot at one point 
in time.
An alternative is the dynamic approach, which computes the net present value of contributions and costs over the entire 
lifetime of migrants and, in some cases, their children. The advantage of this approach is the forward-looking perspective 
and the possibility of exploring changes over time in fiscal impacts between UK-born individuals and migrants. The 
limitation of the dynamic approach is that it requires strong future assumptions about many factors such as migrant 
fertility rates, return migration rates, productivity rates, labour market participation rates, tax rates and government 
spending, among others. The results of these studies tend to differ significantly based on changes in these assumptions.
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In theory, the fiscal effects of immigration largely depend on migrants’ characteristics 
(skills, age, length of stay), their impacts on the labour market and welfare entitlements
Estimating the net fiscal impact of immigration is a challenging task because of the large number of factors 
affecting it. Among other important factors, estimates must take account of migrants’ characteristics such as skill 
level, age distribution, family composition, health status, fertility patterns, and the temporary versus permanent 
nature of immigration. Among these characteristics, the skill level of migrants (and its correlation with the other 
characteristics) is likely to be one of the main determinants of their fiscal impacts in the short run. High-skilled 
migrants working in highly paid jobs can be expected to pay more taxes than low-skilled migrants in low-waged 
jobs. At the same time, the participation in welfare programmes tends to decrease with skill level, i.e. higher skilled 
migrants are less likely to be eligible for means tested welfare benefits than low-skilled migrants.
There are two key assumptions and caveats. First, not all skilled migrants are doing skilled work in the UK. Second, as 
is the case in other countries with high levels of immigration, some migrants are explicitly excluded from full access 
to certain types of benefits in the UK. For instance, many non-EU nationals with permission to reside in the UK have 
‘no recourse to public funds’. As such, they are not able to access many types of benefits in the UK.
The fiscal impact of migration in the UK is small and differs by migrant group (e.g. EEA 
migrants vs. non-EEA migrants, recent migrants vs. all migrants)
Attempts at analysing the fiscal impact of immigration in the UK started about a decade ago with a Home Office 
report (Gott and Johnston 2002). The report used a static approach, as do all other main studies in the topic for 
the UK. The focus of the report was the fiscal year 1999-2000. Among the key decisions made by the authors was 
the definition of which group of individuals should constitute the “migrant population” whose net fiscal contribution 
would be estimated. The study defined migrants as foreign-born residents. Most of the research on the net fiscal 
impact of immigration in the UK has followed this approach.
There are major data gaps related to this topic in the UK and, as such, Gott and Johnston (2002) pointed out that 
they could only provide tentative results. Their study concluded that the overall contribution of migrants was 
positive, but that the impact varies with the characteristics of migrants. The estimates suggest that for the fiscal 
year 1999-2000 migrants in the UK contributed GBP 31.2 billion in taxes and used benefits and state services 
valued at GBP 28.8 billion. Therefore, the net fiscal contribution of migrants was approximately GBP + 2.5 billion.
A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), presented an updated version of the Home Office 
analysis (Sriskandarajah et al. 2005). Its main contribution was to extend the estimation to cover five years of data. 
The IPPR analysis suggests that real revenues from migrants grew by 22% from fiscal year 1999-2000 to fiscal 
year 2003-2004 (reaching GBP 41.2 billion). However, the expenditure associated with immigrants reached GBP 
41.6 billion in the fiscal year 2003-2004. Therefore, the net contribution of immigrants in the fiscal year 2003-
2004 was negative at GBP -0.4 billion.
The IPPR report focuses on the relative fiscal contribution of immigrants versus that of natives. In any given year, 
the contribution of migrants (in volume) depends on the state of public finances (i.e. surplus versus deficit) and the 
fact that migrants are having a positive or negative fiscal impact (in terms of volume) does not indicate clearly how 
they compare to UK-born individuals. Even if migrants pay more in taxes than the cost of services received, there 
could still be a smaller gap (between taxes paid and services received) for migrants than for natives. Sriskandarajah 
et al. (2005) argue that the relevant measure is not the actual net figure, but the ratio of migrants’ contributions to 
migrants’ consumption of public services. This ratio is referred to as the net annual fiscal contribution (NAFI).
IPPR’s analysis suggests that the NAFI for migrants in 1999-2000 was 1.06, higher than the UK-born value (1.01). 
For 2003-2004, the difference between migrants and the UK-born increased; the NAFI for migrants was 0.99 
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compared to 0.88 for the UK-born. The fact that the NAFI was less than one suggests that in 2003-2004 the net 
fiscal contribution of migrants was negative, but that it was “less negative” than that of the UK-born individuals.
A study by Rowthorn (2008) adopted a slightly different approach and made an adjustment to estimate what 
the migrant contribution would be with a balanced budget. Rowthorn also adjusted for a number of other factors 
including additional costs for asylum support, ethnic relations support, excess medical costs (in relation to HIV) and 
a correction for the inclusion of defence spending (a public good whose scale is largely unaffected by the migrant 
inflow). The study concluded that the actual net contribution of migrants in 2003-2004 was small but positive of 
about GBP + 0.6 billion (Rowthorn 2008).
A 2006 report by MigrationWatch UK was critical of the allocation of spending on services for children born to 
one migrant parent and a UK-born parent. Previous analysis considered the spending on these children to be part 
of the benefits consumed by the UK-born group (Rowthorn [2008] also adjusted estimates to address this point). 
According to MigrationWatch, the appropriate approach is to split this spending in equal parts between the UK-
born and foreign-born groups. By making this change, MigrationWatch estimates suggest that the net fiscal impact 
of migrants is negative (the estimates are GBP -1 billion for 1999-2000 and GBP -5 billion for 2003-2004). 
MigrationWatch also presents estimates allocating all children of mixed couples to the migrant group and, as 
expected, the fiscal burden of migrants is estimated to be much higher (around GBP -3.8 billion in 1999-2000).
Table 1 provides a summary of the findings for the UK for the fiscal years 1999-2000 to 2003-2004.
Table 1 – Comparison of different estimates of the fiscal effects of immigration for the fiscal years 1999-2000 
to 2003-2004 (in GBP billion)
A study evaluating 
the fiscal impact of 
immigration from the A8 
countries (those which 
joined the EU in 2004 
and which did not already 
enjoy right of entry to 
the UK) found that in the 
four fiscal years after 
2004 (i.e. 2005-2006, 
2006-2007, 2007-
2008 and 2008-2009), 
A8 migrants made a 
positive contribution 
to public finances 
(Dustmann et al. 2010). 
While A8 migrants 
work mostly in lower 
wage occupations, they 
have high labour force 
participation rates and 
employment rates, a fact 
which offsets the impact 
of their lower wages.
Note: see original sources for a full discussion of differences in methodology and assumptions between 
estimates.
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Dustmann and Fratini (2013) estimated the fiscal impact of EEA and non-EEA migrants during the 1995-2011 
period. Their results suggest that during this period the total annual fiscal impact of EEA migrants in the UK was 
close to GBP + 8.8 billion per year (an average of close to GBP + 0.6 billion per year). The total annual fiscal impact 
of non-EEA migrants for this period was estimated at GBP -104 (an average of close to GBP -6.5 billion).
Dustmann and Frattini (2013) also presented estimates for recent migrants, defined as those who arrived to the UK 
since 2000. The estimates suggest that the fiscal impact of recent EEA migrants for the 2001-2011 period was 
GBP + 22.1 billion and the fiscal impact of non-EEA migrants was + 2.9 billion.
MigrationWatch UK (2014) criticised the assumptions of Dustmann and Frattini (2013). The criticism covers many 
factors, but overall it suggests that Dustmann and Frattini (2013) exaggerated the revenues the government 
obtains from migrants and underestimate the cost of public service provision to migrants. Using new multiple 
assumptions, MigrationWatch UK (2014) finds that during the 1995-2011 period the fiscal impact of EEA migrants 
was GBP -13.6 billion and the fiscal impact of non-EEA migrants was GBP -135 billion. Looking at the recent EEA 
migrants, MigrationWatch UK (2014) estimates that the total fiscal impact of recent EEA migrants for the 2001-
2011 period was GBP -0.25 billion and the impact of recent non-EEA migrants was GBP -27 billion for the same 
period.
Rowthorn (2014) re-evaluated the estimates of Dustmann and Frattini (2013) for recent migrants. In particular, he 
argues for the need of a British worker displacement adjustment given the evidence that migration displaces British 
workers. After this and other adjustments he finds a negative impact of recent EEA migration of about GBP -0.3 
billion and a negative impact of recent non-EEA migration of GBP -29.7 billion.
See Rowthorn (2014) for more discussion of differences between the Dustmann and Frattini (2013) and 
MigrationWatch UK (2014).
Table 2 provides a summary of the findings for the UK for the fiscal years 1995-2011 and 2001-2011.
Table 2 – Comparison of different estimates of the fiscal effects of immigration for the fiscal years 1995-2011 
and 2001-2011 (billion, 2011 GPB equivalent)
Note: see original sources for a full discussion of differences in methodology and assumptions between estimates.
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The Office for Budget Responsibility suggests higher net migration reduces pressure on 
government debt over time. This result is based on the fact that incoming migrants are 
assumed to be more likely to be of working age than the population in general
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2013) explored the long-term fiscal sustainability of the UK using the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2010-based population projections. OBR adopts the ONS low net-migration 
variant (+140,000) to estimate their central projection. They also provide fiscal projections assuming the ONS high 
net-migration variant (+260,000) and the ONS zero net-migration variant. OBR finds that higher net migration 
reduces pressure on government debt over time. This result is based on the assumption that incoming migrants are 
more likely to be of working age than the population in general. As shown in Figure 1, based on OBR projections, the 
high net-migration variant results in a public sector net debt as a share of GDP of 73%. On the other hand, the zero 
net-migration variant results in a public sector net debt as share of GDP of 145%.
Figure 1
Cross-country evidence for the years 2007-2009 suggests that the fiscal impact of 
migration in the UK (+0.46% of GDP) was more positive than the fiscal impact of migration 
in 16 other OECD countries
The OECD (2013) estimated the fiscal impact of immigration in all OECD countries. The evidence for the years 
2007-2009 suggests that the fiscal impact of migration in the UK (+ 0.46% of GDP) was more positive than the 
fiscal impact of migration in 16 other OECD countries. The UK occupies the 11th position in regards to the fiscal 
impact of migration across OECD countries (see Figure 2). The estimated fiscal impact of migration in the UK is also 
higher than the average impact in OECD countries (+ 0.35% of GDP). The OECD country with the most positive 
fiscal impact from migration is Luxembourg (+ 2% of GDP), while the country with the more negative fiscal impact 
from migration was Germany (-1% of GDP).
Government	debt	and	net-migration	assumptions
Chart	provided	by	www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk
OBR	central	projection	(net-migration	+140k)
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Figure 2
Evidence gaps and limitations
Estimates of the fiscal effects of immigration depend on assumptions about how migrants use public services. Most 
studies simply estimate the share of the population represented by migrants and assume that they account for the 
same share of consumption of public services. Yet migrants have different characteristics from UK-born individuals 
and as such may use public services differently. For instance, migrants may use services such as translation services 
in schools and hospitals that are not typically used by the native-born population. One difficulty in addressing this 
point is that there is no systematic collection of the user’s migration status at the point of delivery of many public 
services.
On the other hand, some migrants deliver public services as well as consuming them. It may be possible to deliver 
services in the public sector at a lower cost because of the availability of migrants willing to work at a lower wage. 
These pros and cons of migration for specific sectors are difficult to measure in practice because of the lack of data 
in most cases.
Any assessment of the fiscal effects of immigration critically depends on the treatment of migrants’ children. If the 
definition of a migrant is an individual born outside the country, then the children of migrants born in the country 
should be part of the native-born group. However, it is possible to argue that these children would not have been 
in the country if their parents had not migrated in the first place and, therefore, children are part of the migrant 
group. This is complicated further by the existence of children of mixed couples (i.e. one UK-born and one foreign-
born). It is not clear if these children should be included in one group or the other, or simply “split” between the 
two groups.The fiscal impacts of immigration also depend on the effects of migrants on the tax contributions and 
use of public services of the UK-born. One example is the labour market impact of immigration, especially whether 
and to what extent the employment of migrants creates more unemployment among domestic workers. Increasing 
unemployment among domestic workers leads to less tax revenues and increase consumption of welfare benefits. 
Most fiscal impact studies assume that the impact of migrants on domestic workers employment is negligible, yet 
empirical findings from the literature on the employment effects of immigration remain mixed (Migration Advisory 
Cross-country	fiscal	impact	of	migration,	2007-2009
Chart	provided	by	www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk
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Committee 2012, Rowthorn 2008). Another typical example about immigration increasing the fiscal burden of the 
UK-born population is the possibility that the presence of migrants increases housing prices (including rents) and 
displaces the UK-born population from the rental sector to the social housing sector (see our briefing on ‘Migrants 
and Housing in the UK: Experiences and Impacts’). On the other hand, the presence of migrants may also increase 
the tax contribution of the UK-born. For instance, the presence of low skilled migrant females working as nannies 
may allow domestic workers to increase their labour supply increasing also their tax contributions. These types of 
indirect effects has been mostly absent from the previous literature in the UK.
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The Migration Observatory
Based at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the 
University of Oxford, the Migration Observatory provides independent, 
authoritative, evidence-based analysis of data on migration and 
migrants in the UK, to inform media, public and policy debates, and to 
generate high quality research on international migration and public 
policy issues. The Observatory’s analysis involves experts from a wide 
range of disciplines and departments at the University of Oxford.
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Glossary and Terms
•	 NAFI: Net annual fiscal contribution of migrants expressed as a ratio of migrants’ contributions to migrants’ 
consumption of public services and state benefits.
•	 Net Fiscal Impact: If migrants contribute more to the government finances than the cost of services received, 
they are net fiscal contributors. If the cost of the services used by migrants is higher than their contributions, 
they represent a net fiscal cost.
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